Iran wants a new nuclear deal by March 2022


According to senior economic and political sources close to the Iranian government, solely by Last week, Tehran announced to high-ranking representatives of the European Commission in Brussels that it would like to talk about a quick resumption of negotiations in order to reactivate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – better known as the “nuclear deal”. “The supreme leader [Ali Khamenei] himself is behind this new initiative, which is mainly driven by the deteriorating economic situation in the country, ”said one of the leading sources. “The aim is to agree a new version of the JCPOA and to drop the sanctions imposed by the USA by the end of the current year [Iranian calendar] year [ending on 20 March 2022],” he added.

Although the Iranian economy is sustained in part 25-year deal with ChinaBeijing was reluctant to provide direct financial support to Tehran, given the unexpectedly tough line taken by Joe Biden’s new US presidential administration. A major US shot off China’s bow came in March from new Secretary of State Antony Blinken when he said the US had raised its “deep concerns about China’s actions, including Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, cyberattacks on the United States,” [and] economic coercion on our allies. ”These views were repeated at the G7 summit in Britain in June, when Biden himself forged an alliance to compete with China’s One Belt, One Road project. As pointed out exclusively by, this tough line is also used by the US in relation to China Combating trade imbalances between the two countries.

This reluctance by China to challenge Washington directly over its Iran policy has led to a gradual deterioration in the Islamic Republic’s economy since the US reinstated all sanctions after its unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. Only two years later – around this time last year – based on a comparative benchmark from November 2019 (even about a year after the reintroduction of the last of the last sanctions), Iran’s GDP growth was minus 22 percent, while unemployment was around 37 percent, inflation at 65 percent, and there – to date in this period – the rial has lost around 65 percent against a basket of global core currencies. Iran, for example, had a budget deficit of 80 percent and a trade balance of minus 6.5 billion US dollars.

In the year since then, the situation has worsened, with the most serious repercussions for the Supreme Leader and his key supporters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that Iran was able to spread its Islam throughout the world. “Iran’s main economic problem is that its foreign exchange reserves are now well below $ 10 billion.” [compared to about US$114 billion just before the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018], and its gold reserves are also very low now, ”a senior Iranian source said last week. “This means that the IRGC is facing a sticking point when it comes to funding its international network of proxies that will be used to project Iranian influence, including in the currently most important operational areas in Yemen, Lebanon and Syria,” because these people want payments in both cases. ” [U.S.] Dollars or gold, ”he added. “Although China still is buy Iranian oil, it is still the heavily reduced tariff of the 25-year contract, “he emphasized.

Iran asks the European Union (EU) for its help in reviving a workable version of the JCPOA for the US as two of the three key European powers at the time of Washington’s withdrawal – Germany and France. rejected the US action. The other major EU member at the time – Great Britain – was also against the exit, but its negativity was tempered by its desire to secure a beneficial trade deal with the US after its own exit, which was voted for in 2016 . The EU broadly felt that it was preferable to keep Iran within the boundaries of the JCPOA than to let Tehran do what it wanted effectively.

Thus, shortly after the US announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA deal, the EU imposed its “blocking statute” which made it illegal for EU companies to obey US sanctions. At the same time, the EU foreign affairs representative Federica Mogherini said that the JCPOA agreement “is not a bilateral agreement … [it]. ‘ The then Federal Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel warned: “We must also tell the Americans that their behavior on the Iran issue will drive us Europeans to a common position with Russia and China against the USA.” At the same time, the EU tried to build a Payment system – Instex – that would bypass all US payment sanctions, though it had little tangible results.

However, the E3s – Germany, France and the UK – were very unimpressed by the quality of the statements made to them by senior Iranian Foreign Ministry officials over the past week and Tehran’s position in playing a tough negotiating game with the US recent private talks with Russia suffered a severe blow. In these conversations that are all around Extension of the 20-year contract between Tehran and Moscow, which expires this year, it has been made clear to Tehran that Russia would not jeopardize its Middle East relations with Israel by directly or indirectly supporting Iranian military or paramilitary activities across the region. “This was a major blow for the IRGC to reinforce China’s distrust of the US and the EU’s negative attitude towards what it had seen from the new Iranian government, ready to take into account any US hardline clauses that are coming out the original JCPOA drafts were deleted, ”one of the Iranian sources told

The full list of the original 12 hard clauses that former US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry wanted in the original draft of the JCPOA, but which were backed up after permanent UN members France, China and Russia – plus Germany – were removed Iranian objections to them can be found here, as described exclusively by at this time. These were precisely the key clauses that Trump – and his former national security adviser, John Bolton – wanted to reintroduce into any new version of the JCPOA that would enter after the sanctions resumed appropriately after Iran was appropriately crippled (as planned). imposed after the US unilateral withdrawal from the agreement in May 2018. Iran’s first likely negotiating position is to be found here, as described exclusively by back then.

With that in mind, according to Iranian sources, Iran will ultimately agree to anything it has to agree to in order to get what it wants – lifting sanctions and free access where it needs it – as long as it can do so without breaking it having to keep up with everything it doesn’t want to meet, so the lists are practically irrelevant. Even more so, as Iran’s accession to it Full membership of the SCO will mean that the main problem Iran faces when the full details of the 25-year deal with China created in September 2019 – and led to official denials by high-ranking government officials in Tehran – that is, that Iran was bought up by China and thereby became a customer state, can be disguised as an investment flow stemming from its membership in the SCO. The process began when declarations were received last week from Iran’s new Petroleum Minister Javad Owji that plans are underway to attract US $ 145 billion from Iranian and foreign investors to the petroleum industry over the next 4 to 8 years.

More top readings from Oileli:


About Author

Leave A Reply